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Abstract
This paper reflects on the balancing of public interests that needs to be undertaken 
under English law when dealing with posthumous medical confidentiality. Until 2007, 
doctors were bound only by professional codes of ethics to maintain confidentiality 
after their patients’ death. In 2008, the High Court stated that it is arguable that confi-
dentiality applies in the post-mortem context. This, it claimed, is in the public interest. 
The court then followed the ecthr in using the same basis – public interest – to accept 
that there may be exceptions to this duty. This paper considers different situations 
where multiple interests come together for and against the posthumous disclosure of 
medical information. This examination suggests that there is considerable uncertainty 
caused by using one notion of public interest to justify confidentiality, and another to 
make the case for disclosure. It calls for the legislator to intervene to help resolve the 
conundrum.
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1 That is, “the respecting of other people’s secrets (in the sense of information they do not wish 
to have further disclosed without their permission)” – see R. Gillon, Philosophical Medical 
Ethics (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1994) 107.
2 “Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients, whether in connection with my profes-
sional practice or not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as consider-
ing all such things to be private” – ‘Hippocratic Oath’ available at <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
hmd/greek/greek_oath.html> (retrieved 1 October 2013). It is nevertheless interesting to 
observe that the obligations of secrecy therein was motivated as much by the protection 
of trade secrets and the desire to control initiates as it was with the patient’s interests – see 
I.E. Thompson, ‘The nature of confidentiality’, Journal of Medical Ethics 5 (1979) 57.
3 C. Jones, ‘The utilitarian argument for medical confidentiality: a pilot study of patients’ 
views’, Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (2003) 348.
4 P. Sankar, et. al., ‘Patient perspectives on medical confidentiality’, Journal of General Internal 
Medicine 18 (2003) 659.
5 J. Carlisle, et. al., ‘Concerns over confidentiality may deter adolescents from consulting their 
doctors: a qualitative exploration’, Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2006) 133.
6 Z v. Finland, no. 220009/93 (1997) 25 ehrr 371, para. 95.
7 H.E. Emson, ‘Confidentiality: a modified value’, Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (1988) 87.
8 G. Niveau, et. al., ‘Medical confidentiality and the competent patient’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 39 (11) (2013); G. Jenkins, et. al., ‘A qualitative study of women’s views on medical 
confidentiality’, Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2005) 499.
9 C. Jones, (n.3) 348.
1 Introduction
Medical confidentiality1 is a timeless concept. From the Hippocratic Oath2  
in ancient times to the present day, the need for doctors to protect patient 
confidentiality has always been unequivocally expressed. The primary 
rationale for this obligation is health promotion.3 Without the assurance of 
confidentiality, it is believed that patients would be reluctant to seek medical 
treatment and/or be less frank when divulging personal and sensitive informa-
tion relating to their health concerns.4 This would prevent a correct diagnosis 
from being made and from patients getting the appropriate treatment for their 
conditions.5 This could endanger not only the health of the patients them-
selves, but also that of the community in the case of transmissible diseases.6 
Having disclosed candidly and fully, patients should be entitled to expect that 
the privacy of the divulged information is respected by the confidentiality 
afforded to it.7 The duty thereby helps establish the trust that is crucial for a 
successful doctor-patient relationship.8 It could also enhance autonomy by 
giving patients control over the use of their personal information.9 In view of 
all these, the obligation of medical confidentiality during the lifetime of the 
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10 See e.g. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] rpc 41 at 4; Stephens v. Avery [1988] 
Ch 449 at 455.
11 See Directive 95/46/ec as implemented in the uk Data Protection Act 1998 (in particular 
section 2).
12 Campbell v. mgn Ltd [2004] ukhl 22; Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights.
13 A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] ac 109.
14 J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 224.
15 For example, the General Medical Council (gmc) reminds doctors that their “duty of con-
fidence continues after a patient has died”. This was echoed by the British Medical 
Association (bma) who advised their members that “the ethical obligation to respect a 
patient’s confidentiality extends beyond death”. The Royal College of Psychiatrists too 
declared that “[a]n individual’s death does not terminate the duty of confidentiality owed to 
the individual” – see gmc, ‘Confidentiality’ (2009) paragraph 70; bma, ‘Confidentiality 
and disclosure of health information tool kit’ 49; Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘Good 
psychiatric practice: confidentiality and information sharing’ (2010) 11.
16 J. Berg, ‘Grave secrets: legal and ethical analysis of postmortem confidentiality’, 
Connecticut Law Review (2001) 81 at 87.
17 C. Ploem, ‘Medical confidentiality after a patient’s death, with particular reference to The 
Netherlands’ Medicine and Law 20 (2001) 215.
18 [2008] ewhc 2196 (qb).
19 Per Foskett J. at para. 18.
patient has long enjoyed legal recognition in the uk.10 Statute11 and case law 
have also affirmed that medical information is “obviously private”12 and that 
there is a public interest in its protection.13 Failure on the part of a doctor to 
maintain patient confidentiality could amount to an interference with privacy 
as well as a breach of confidence.14
In contrast, the existence of and the basis for posthumous medical 
confidentiality have always been mired in uncertainty. Although professional 
codes of ethics have consistently expressed that the duty to protect confidenti-
ality extends beyond death,15 these proclamations are not accompanied by 
explanations as to why it is important to maintain posthumous medical 
confidentiality. They therefore do not provide adequate instructions on the 
basis for, or the interests served by, the ethical duty.16 Further, the professional 
codes’ acceptance that the demise of a patient does not obliterate the obliga-
tion of medical secrecy17 was never augmented by concrete legal recognition 
and protection. In fact, it was only in 2008 that the High Court eventually 
pronounced in Lewis v. Secretary of State for Health18 that “it is arguable that 
the duty [of medical confidentiality] does survive the patient’s death.”19 
However, whilst this decision acknowledges that the duty subsists primarily 
for the same public interest reason as during the patient’s lifetime, the Court 
did so only when considering whether to allow the disclosure of the medical 
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20 ea/2006/0090.
records of deceased persons. Indeed, the court framed disclosure as a balanc-
ing of public interests, discussed with reference to the exceptional circum-
stances of the case. We find this juxtaposition of the “public interest” to both 
acknowledge the existence of a duty of confidentiality and to justify a need for 
disclosure, intriguing.
In this paper, we seek to consider the different situations where multiple 
interests come together for and against the disclosure of information provided 
by deceased patients during their lifetime under the safeguard of medical con-
fidentiality. This is with the aim of ascertaining the implications of Lewis on 
posthumous confidentiality. To do this, Section Two of the work will briefly 
review the facts of and the decision in the case, noting in particular the excep-
tional circumstances involved. In the Third Section, the paper reflects on the 
nature of postmortem disclosure: should access be considered the rule or an 
exception? Here we compare the position of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ecthr) and English law. The paper then discusses whether situations 
of antemortem disclosure of medical information based on public interest 
considerations can be extended to a postmortem scenario. This overview 
leads to the conclusion that the ruling in Lewis alone is not enough. It is time 
for the legislator to intervene. Even if multiple interests are involved when 
considering disclosure of medical information after death, the complexity of 
the situation should not discourage the legislator from identifying areas where 
disclosure of the medical information of a deceased person is desirable. 
Identifying which disclosures are in the public interest (even if “public inter-
est” is narrowly defined to refer to persons sharing part of the genetic pool of 
the deceased) a priori allows for better legal certainty and is less dependent on 
a case-by-case weighing of interests.
2 Lewis v. Secretary of State for Health
Although Lewis v. Secretary of State for Health was only heard before the 
High Court, its significance should not be underestimated. The case represents 
the first ever judicial pronouncement on the need to maintain posthumous 
medical confidentiality in the uk. Up till then, the closest available authority 
on the matter was the Information Commissioner’s Office (ico)’s Information 
Tribunal’s decision in Bluck v. Information Commissioner and Epsom and 
St Helier University nhs Trust,20 which ruled that the duty of confidence owed 
by doctors to their patients continues even after the patient has died. 
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21 Hereinafter referred to as ‘The Inquiry’.
22 Para. 58.
Importantly, the court also agreed with the Tribunal’s ruling that posthumous 
medical confidentiality was a matter in the public interest.
However, it is important to highlight that the pronouncement came about 
in circumstances where it was actually access to the medical information of 
deceased patients that was sought. The court therefore had to work backwards 
and decide beforehand whether such information was subject to a duty of 
confidentiality. More importantly is the fact that the request for disclosure was 
made by a public Inquiry co-sponsored by The Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and The Secretary of State for Health. 
It therefore had State backing, rather than a request for disclosure made by 
private individuals. The Inquiry in question was known as The Redfern Inquiry 
into Human Tissue Analysis in uk Nuclear Facilities.21 It was set up in 2007 to 
investigate complaints made by the family members of a number of individu-
als whose organs/tissues had been removed at nhs (National Health Service) 
or other facilities without their surviving relatives’ knowledge nor consent, and 
sent to nuclear laboratory facilities for analysis. Those individuals, who died 
between 1962–1991, had worked in the nuclear industry and the analysis had 
aimed to determine the radionuclide content of the organs/tissues. In order to 
investigate the complaints made by their relatives, and make the necessary 
recommendations to the government, the Inquiry had sought access to the 
medical records and other relevant documents relating to those individuals.
The custodian of those records and documents, Dr Nicholas Lewis, was 
willing to comply with the Inquiry’s request for information. However, he had 
been concerned that this might render him and his colleagues in breach of 
their duty of confidentiality to those individuals. He therefore sought, by bring-
ing this case, the authority of the court to disclose the requested information. 
It was in determining the lawfulness of this proposed action that the court 
made the pronouncement that the duty of confidentiality and non-disclosure 
arguably prevails after death. It then engaged in a weighing exercise to estab-
lish whether “the public interest in disclosure of the material sought outweighs 
the other public interest, namely, that of maintaining the confidentiality of 
medical records and information”.22 In reaching its conclusion to allow for dis-
closure, the court identified three distinct sets of “public interest”. One, that 
those families are entitled to know “the truth”. Next, that it is important to 
maintain public confidence in the nhs and the nuclear industry either through 
the findings or the recommendations that would be made if past practices are 
found to be deficient. Thirdly, the fact that the Inquiry was co-sponsored by 
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23 Para. 59.
24 J.M. Balkin, ‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society’, New York University Law Review 79(1) (2004).
25 Application no. 56148/00 of 18 May 2004.
two Secretaries of State, which are answerable to Parliament is, according 
to the High Court, “compelling evidence of the public interest in enabling 
The Inquiry to have the fullest facilities to carry out its functions”.23
By framing disclosure as a balancing of public interests, it would appear 
that access was allowed in Lewis in view of the exceptional circumstances of 
the case. However, would and should disclosure be possible in less exceptional 
circumstances? If so, how should the balancing exercise be undertaken? These 
will be looked at next.
3 Balancing the Public Interests
3.1 Disclosure: Rule or Exception?
Living in an era where access to information is made easy by the internet, 
we are used to accessing all forms of information, including (at times very) 
personal details about ourselves, our loved ones and/or our enemies. It is often 
said that the internet, and access to information in particular, are important 
blocks in the building of or the strengthening of democratic societies.24 It is, 
following the reasoning of the ecthr, imperative in the public interest for 
citizens to have access to information (and the right’s corollary, the right to 
freedom of expression). Against this background, any exception to openness 
and accessibility should be treated as an exception rather than a rule even if 
the content of that personal information relates to the medical condition of a 
deceased person.
Indeed in Plon (Société) v. France,25 the case concerning the prohibition of 
the distribution of "Le Grand Secret", the book written by Dr Claude Gubler 
about President Mitterrand and his cancer diagnosis and treatment, the ecthr 
ultimately found that the ban imposed by the French courts nine months after 
the publication of the book (even if it related to medical information obtained 
in confidence by the personal physician of the former President) was a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr). 
The reasoning of the Court revolved around whether the request from 
Mitterrand’s widow and children to ban publication of the medical informa-
tion of the deceased met a pressing social need. The exception to openness 
and accessibility of information therefore needs to be based on a “pressing 
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26 D. Voorhoof, ‘European Court of Human Rights Case of Plon v. France’, Case note iris 2004–
10:3/3, available at <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2004/10/article3.en.html> (retrieved on 
15 October 2013).
27 For further discussion, see J.P. Mifsud Bonnici and K.A. Choong, ‘Access to the Health 
Records of Deceased Patients: Why the Law is in Need of Review’, Computer and Security 
Law Review 25 (2009) 155.
28 Section 3(1)(f).
social need”. What tipped the balance in favour of openness in this case, were 
primarily two key points: the information related to a prominent public figure 
of national importance; and the practical reality that the book, in spite of the 
interim injunction, had gone viral on the internet and had by then also led to 
more than 40,000 print copies to be sold at a time when the ban was still in 
place.26 These two considerations, which represent the public interest in the 
debate concerning his tenure as the President of France, was said to have 
outweighed any argument of “pressing social need” by the family to keep the 
information confidential and out of the public domain. It seems clear from 
this judgement that the legal protection afforded to medical confidentiality 
after death is primarily a matter of a balancing of public interests.
This juxtaposition and weighing of two competing public interests was 
the same approach that was adopted in Lewis. This strongly suggests that the 
High Court had been influenced and inspired by the ecthr. However, even 
long before Lewis declared that the duty of medical confidentiality survives 
the patient’s death, English Law has not been known to share the ecthr’s 
ethos of openness and accessibility to medical information relating to deceased 
patients. In fact, it has taken a predominantly contrary stance: openness 
(or disclosure) is an exception and not the rule. This is borne out by the fact 
that despite the existence of two statutes through which access to the health 
records of deceased patients could be sought, both have determined very 
limited possibilities of access.27 The Access to Health Records Act 1988, for 
instance, only allows access to a personal representative or those who may 
have a claim arising out of the deceased person’s death.28 Meanwhile, the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, which recognises the right to access any 
information held by the government or public authorities, provides for exemp-
tions to information that is obtained by those bodies in confidence, which 
includes most information held in health records. Given this background, it 
was not surprising that Lewis ruled that the duty of confidentiality continues 
beyond death. It was making explicit what English law has, hitherto, alluded to.
But all this also indicates that the weighing of public interests in the 
paradigm espoused by the ecthr takes place in a climate of openness and 
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29 Para. H14.
30 Para. 30.
31 Hunter v. Mann [1974] qb 767, per Boreham J. at 772.
32 E.g. those taken care of in modern nhs hospitals are considered to have impliedly con-
sented to the disclosure of their medical information to all health care professionals who 
need to be involved in their care – see H.E. Emson, ‘Confidentiality: a modified value’ 
Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (1988) 87.
33 These include risks of murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, domestic violence, child 
abuse, terrorism, road traffic offences, gun crime and knife crime – see W v. Egdell [1990] 1 
All er 835; section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000; section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988; 
accessibility. Whereas, the one adopted in English law might have erred on the 
side of caution and restraint. Early indications of this can be gleaned from 
the two judgments themselves. The ecthr, allowing disclosure a mere nine 
months after President Mitterrand’s death, opined that “the more remote the 
date of the President’s death, the more [the pressing social need for confiden-
tiality] decline in importance and the more the public interest in the debate 
concerning his two seven-year terms of office outweighed the imperative of 
protecting … medical secrecy”.29 Foskett J., in the High Court, stated in con-
trasting terms that “I would not regard…the passage of time generally in a 
matter of this nature, as eradicating or diminishing significantly the strength 
of the obligation of confidentiality.”30 Admittedly, neither the information to 
be disclosed nor the stature of the patients in the two cases are similar. 
However, the conflicting tones may signal that the balancing of public inter-
ests under English law may not always easily result in disclosure.
3.2 The Public Interest in Postmortem Disclosure
In addition, compared to the existence of numerous well-established cases, 
and legislative provisions and professional guidelines offering guidance to 
doctors on the public interests that could outweigh the need to protect 
antemortem confidentiality, there is relatively little guidance in the case of 
postmortem confidentiality. But are there similarly persuasive reasons for 
recognising exceptions in the case of deceased patients? If so, how can these 
be facilitated without having to wait for a body of case law, legislative provi-
sions and professional guidelines to build up over the years?
For living patients, disclosure of confidential medical information is 
now accepted and allowed under English law in various circumstances. 
Apart from when the patients themselves have explicitly31 or implicitly32  
consented to the divulgence, it is also accepted as justifiable in situations 
where identifiable individuals or the public can be protected from crime,33 
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gmc Confidentiality 2009; and gmc, ‘Confidentiality: Reporting Gunshot and Knife 
Wounds (Supplementary Guidance)’ (2009) paras. 3a and 5.
34 See the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010 (si 2010/659, Regulation 2) 
which enumerate several medical conditions (e.g. acute meningitis, anthrax, cholera, 
diphtheria, food poisoning, measles, typhus and whooping cough) as notifiable diseases. 
A doctor who treats any patient whom he reasonably suspects is suffering from any of 
those conditions would be under an obligation to notify the appropriate government 
authority. This is to enable measures to be taken to prevent those diseases from spreading. 
Also, although hiv/aids is not included within the list of notifiable diseases, doctors are 
informed that they may disclose to a known sexual contact of a patient who suffers from 
hiv/aids if they have reason to believe that those individuals are at risk of infection 
and that the patient has not apprised them and cannot be persuaded to do so – see gmc, 
‘Confidentiality: Disclosing Information About Serious Communicable Diseases 
(Supplementary Guidance)’ (2009), paragraph 10.
35 As regards genetic information, doctors have been advised that where consent to 
reveal the information has been refused by the patient, they are nevertheless justified in 
releasing the information where the benefit to the recipient is so substantial as to out-
weigh any distress caused to the patient. Not only that, they are also requested to provide 
the necessary information on how those relatives can seek a genetics referral for them-
selves – see e.g. Royal College of Physicians, ‘Consent and confidentiality in genetic 
practice’ (2006), paragraph 2.5.3; nhs National Genetics Education and Development 
Centre, ‘Genetic information: consent and confidentiality issues’ (2012), paragraph 4.
36 For instance, the Abortion Regulations 1991 (si 1991/499, Regulation 4) requires that the 
nhs number, date of birth and full postcode of women who underwent termination of 
pregnancies under the Abortion Act 1967 to be supplied to the Chief Medical Officer.
37 E.g. section 251(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006.
38 P. van der Hart-Zwart, ‘Does the regulation of medical research in the Netherlands 
adequately protect privacy rights after death?’ (2012) 22(4) tge Jaargang 114.
and communicable34 or hereditary diseases,35 and where the information 
could facilitate statistical36 and research purposes.37 In those cases, it is 
assumed that the public interest served by keeping medical information 
confidential is outweighed by the public interest served by the release of the 
information.
Returning to deceased patients, the issue that inevitably surfaces following 
Lewis’ confirmation of the duty of posthumous confidentiality is whether there 
should be similar exceptions in the postmortem context i.e. those beyond the 
exceptional circumstances identified in the case. The literature indicates that 
there may be a number of circumstances when this may take place. One would 
be when the patients themselves have consented to the posthumous use of their 
medical information during their lifetime.38 In such cases, it has been argued 
that there is a need to attach moral weight to their wishes and preferences 
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39 M.R. Wicclair, ‘Ethics and research with deceased patients’, Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 17 (2008) 87 at 89–90.
40 Ibid., at 89.
41 A.M. Lucassen, et. al., ‘Role of next of kin in accessing health records of deceased rela-
tives’, British Medical Journal 328 (2004) 952 at 953; B.M. Knoppers, ‘Professional disclo-
sure of familial genetic information’, American Journal of Human Genetics 62 (1998) 474 at 
474–475; J.L. Gold, ‘To warn or not to warn? Genetic information, families, and physician 
liability’ McGill Journal of Medicine 8 (2004) 72.
42 nhs National Genetics Education and Development Centre, ‘Genetic information: con-
sent and confidentiality issues’ (2012), para. 7.
43 B.M. Knoppers, (n.41) 474.
44 K. van Bogaert and G.A. Ogunbanjo, ‘Human immunodeficiency virus: confidentiality and 
disclosure of information to third parties’, South Africa Family Practice 53(6) (2011) 615 at 616.
as this demonstrates respect to living persons.39 To do otherwise is to believe 
and act as if the patient’s aspirations, plans and preferences left no moral 
traces after their death. This, in other words, would merely be an extension of 
an already accepted practice in relation to matters like the honouring of wills 
or known wishes relating to the donation of organs or one’s body for research.
However, it is a known fact that the vast majority of people do not make 
explicit decisions about the postmortem use of their medical information 
for research or other purposes.40 At the same time, there could be compelling 
reasons for favouring access to the information held in their health records. 
One of the strongest claims relates to genetic information. As highlighted 
above, disclosure relating to hereditary diseases has been deemed justifiable 
during a patient’s lifetime. If an individual dies of a genetic condition and his 
relatives thereafter sought access to his medical records, commentators have 
argued that the relevant information should similarly be disclosed after death 
where the relatives stood a substantially high risk of developing a serious and 
otherwise undetected genetic disorder which is preventable or treatable, and 
where the harm of non-disclosure outweighs the harm from disclosure.41 Even 
the nhs has recognised the significance of such disclosure when it specified 
that the “medical record departments of healthcare facilities should help in 
accessing medical information about a deceased person if it would help in 
determining the risk of an individual seeking genetic advice”.42 In addition to 
medical conditions that are transmitted vertically through succeeding genera-
tions, are contagious diseases that are communicated horizontally to others 
through some form of contact.43 Since the duty of posthumous confidentiality 
conflicts with the interests of others either to be protected from harm or to 
ensure that they are aware of the need to seek medical care, it has been simi-
larly argued that this justifies breaching confidentiality.44
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45 Regulation 3.
46 R.D. Strous, ‘To protect or to publish: confidentiality and the fate of the mentally ill 
victims of Nazi euthanasia’, Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (2009) 361 at 363–364.
47 Ibid.
48 A.H. Maixner and K. Morin, ‘Confidentiality of health information postmortem’, Archives 
of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine 125 (2001) 1189 at 1190.
49 J. Berg, (n.16) 93.
50 A.H. Maixner and K. Morin, (n.48) 1190.
Disclosure could also benefit the public in general. To start with, the legisla-
ture has already, through the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 
2010, made it compulsory for doctors to notify the relevant government author-
ity where there is reasonable suspicion that the patients they treated died 
whilst infected: with a notifiable disease or a disease which in their view could 
have posed significant harm to human health.45 The release of this informa-
tion is to enable the relevant authority to prevent the spread of the disease.
Further, as demonstrated in Lewis itself, release of confidential medical 
information is important to facilitate the smooth running of a public investiga-
tion. It is in the interests of a democratic society, for investigations such as the 
one in this case, to be able to bring into the open (questionable) practices of 
public bodies, even if in doing so the medical information of individuals may 
need to be disclosed to the authority or Inquiry team entrusted by statute or 
sponsored by Secretaries of State which are answerable to Parliament.
In addition to such investigations and research into recent or ongoing 
events, researchers may also need access to information when investigating 
incidents that happened in the distant past. In such circumstances, it has been 
argued that access should be allowed when individual identifiers are removed.46 
This is in order to uphold society’s interest in knowing historical data.47
The above considerations would nevertheless have to be balanced against 
the public interest served by postmortem confidentiality. These include the 
inherent value of privacy whereupon posthumous confidentiality is expected 
to function as a means by which the former interests of the deceased in con-
trolling his personal health information are respected.48 The protection offered 
by the duty is particularly valuable at this stage since the patient is no longer 
available to consent to the disclosure or to defend his or her reputation.49 
Further, since it would also assure current and future patients that the infor-
mation which they divulge to their doctors will not be disclosed after death, 
this would serve to strengthen the institution of confidentiality as well as 
public trust in doctors.50 This is because, knowledge on the part of the living 
that their health records could be accessed after their death, could affect their 
behaviour and candour in the doctor-patient relationship. This could in turn 
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51 D.J. Robinson and D. O’Neill, ‘Access to health care records after death: balancing 
confidentiality with appropriate disclosure’, Journal of the American Medical Association 
297(6) (2007) 634.
52 K. van Bogaert and G.A. Ogunbanjo, (n.44) 616.
53 M.R. Wicclair, (n.39) 94–95.
54 Ibid.; M.H. Kottow, ‘Medical confidentiality: an intransigent absolute obligation’, Journal 
of Medical Ethics 12 (1986) 117 at 119.
55 D.S. James and S. Leadbetter, ‘Confidentiality, death and the doctor’, Journal of Clinical 
Pathology 49 (1996) 1 at 2.
56 D.J. Robinson and D. O’Neill, (n.51) 634.
result in suboptimal care being received51 and at worst, they might not even 
seek medical treatment.52
Even where a decedent had given consent during his lifetime, the disclosure 
could potentially harm the decedent’s image and reputation in public,53 with 
the further possibility of distorting the memory of the person as held by his 
family members. The disclosure could also give rise to potential privacy con-
cerns on the part of all survivors within the radius of interest of the deceased.54 
After all, information about oneself is often intertwined with those close to 
them. The release of genetic information to the few who requested for them 
could potentially reveal the propensity of others within the same family to 
develop a particular inheritable condition. This could lead to psychological, 
social and/or financial harm as well as stigmatization, embarrassment and/or 
discrimination which could affect their employability and ability to take out 
health or life insurance.55 Divulgence could also reveal a host of family secrets 
like sexual, physical and emotional abuses and neglect that may have taken 
place. This could compromise the protection of family members and others 
who have in the past volunteered the information to the decedent’s doctor.56
All this signifies that the balancing of public interests in the case of deceased 
patients is far more complex than that for living patients. Yet in spite of the 
complexity, there is little or no guidance from the legislator on either situa-
tions that automatically warrant disclosure or on criteria that can be used 
when considering whether the information (other than in “automatic” situa-
tions) may be disclosed. The exercise of weighing public interests is often a 
task reserved to Courts and Tribunals. Public authorities or medical practitio-
ners asked to disclose the medical information of deceased persons have 
little guidance by which to act. As in the Lewis case, the decision to disclose or 
conceal is referred to the Court to decide and guide. At other times, a negative 
response to disclosure is taken and the person(s) requesting information 
appeals this decision to the relevant Tribunal or Court (as in Bluck). The result 
of this state of affairs is that there is little legal certainty in this field.
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Thus while the confirmation in Lewis that medical confidentiality continues 
even after death has provided some clarity, it is time for more legal precision, 
ideally from the legislator.57 We are conscious that neither all the doubts 
surrounding disclosure nor all the conditions that need to be taken into 
consideration while weighing interests can be fully eliminated by law. However, 
by taking clear legislative steps in some areas, the legislator can remove the 
tensions that surround requests for disclosure. For example, they may decide 
that requests for disclosure of medical information (e.g. those connected to 
genetically inherited medical conditions) can be made where the requesting 
person satisfies a certain set of conditions (e.g. that he/she is genetically related 
to the deceased etc). Legislation should clearly outline the circumstances in 
which disclosure of confidential medical information is acceptable. It should 
also clarify who can gain access or to whom should the disclosure be made; 
how much information they are able to access; and whether there should be a 
time lapse after the patient’s death and if so, how long should it be after the 
death of the patient before access is allowed. It should also be able to balance 
the need for disclosure with the well-being of surviving relatives.
4 Conclusion
This paper is inspired by the Lewis case, where the Court in the uk recognised, 
for the first time, that medical confidentiality survives death and in the 
same breath recognised an exception to the duty. This suggests that medical 
confidentiality after death is primarily a matter of balancing public interests. 
Aware that the situation in Lewis is exceptional, the paper considers other 
situations where multiple interests come together for and against the disclo-
sure of information previously released under the protection of medical confi-
dentiality by a now deceased person.
Analysis of the different situations and conflicting interests involved show 
that there is an evident need for clarification, ideally through the statutory 
route. This would help bypass the need to wait for a body of case law to build 
up over time before clarity and certainty of when disclosure would be success-
ful is eventually attained. In essence, what is being argued in this paper is 
that the practice of Courts (including the ecthr) using the notion of public 
interest – to accept that there may be exceptions to the duty of confidentiality 
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after death – cannot remain solely the responsibility of Courts. It is time for 
the legislator to inject clarity: identifying and spelling out situations where 
disclosure can be either a sine qua non or conditional to the requirements they 
identified. The argument here is that the legislator is (at least theoretically) 
better placed, and democratically entrusted, to identify the public interest or 
interest(s) that the State would like to protect.
The complexity of this task – of spelling out the public interest(s) – should 
not discourage the legislator. It is, one can argue, their responsibility not to 
shun from hard questions.58 Of course, they do not need to act alone in this 
process of identifying areas where disclosure of the medical information of a 
deceased person is desirable. They can, and indeed should, involve stakehold-
ers, lawyers, ethicists and academia to examine the issues and identify which 
disclosures are in the public interest (even if “public interest” is narrowly 
defined to refer to persons sharing part of the deceased’s genetic pool). 
Ultimately, having better legal certainty and being less dependent on a case-
by-case weighing of interests, should outweigh the difficulties in addressing 
the complex ethical, social and legal realities surrounding the disclosure of 
medical information after death.
